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265 
JUST GROW UP ALREADY: THE 
DIMINISHED CULPABILITY OF  
JUVENILE GANG MEMBERS  
AFTER MILLER v. ALABAMA 
Abstract: In Miller v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court held that statutes impos-
ing mandatory sentences of life without parole on juvenile offenders violate the 
Eighth Amendment. In doing so, the Court applied the Eighth Amendment analysis 
normally reserved to review capital sentences. The extension of this analysis to a 
term-of-years sentence rested on the Court’s recognition of developmental differ-
ences that make juveniles categorically less culpable than adults. This Note argues 
that based on Miller, statutory provisions that impose lengthy sentence enhance-
ments on juveniles who commit gang-related crimes, such as those found in Cali-
fornia’s STEP Act, should also be struck down. Such provisions should be struck 
down because the gang setting magnifies many of the developmental differences 
highlighted in Miller, and penological justifications fail to explain the application 
of gang enhancements to juvenile offenders. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, in Miller v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court held that mandato-
ry sentences of life without parole (LWOP) for juveniles violate the Eighth 
Amendment.1 Historically, the Court has been extremely reluctant to strike 
down noncapital sentences as violations of the Eighth Amendment unless they 
are “grossly disproportional” to the underlying crime.2 The Court in Miller, 
however, struck down a noncapital sentencing scheme after applying the more 
rigorous Eighth Amendment analysis normally reserved for capital sentences.3 
It focused on physiological and developmental differences that set juvenile 
                                                                                                                           
 1 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 2469 (2012); see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 2 See Rachael E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 49, 49 (2010) (noting that 
before 2010, it had been almost thirty years since the Supreme Court struck down a noncapital sentence); 
Dan Markel, May Minors Be Retributively Punished After Panetti (and Graham)?, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 
62, 63 (2010); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine in: The Supreme Court 
Opens a Window Between Two Formerly Walled-Off Approaches to Eighth Amendment Proportionality 
Challenges, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 79, 80 (2010). 
 3 See 132 S. Ct. at 2464; see also id. at 2455 (noting that the Court has developed two different 
tests to review Eighth Amendment challenges); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (indicating 
that the approach later used in Miller was previously reserved for death penalty cases). 
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offenders apart from adults to justify extending the use of this analysis.4 By 
using its more rigorous Eighth Amendment analysis, the Court was able to re-
view whether it was constitutional for any juvenile offenders—regardless of 
the particular circumstances of their conviction—to ever be sentenced to man-
datory LWOP.5 
After Miller, it is possible that the Court will extend this approach to oth-
er types of mandatory sentences imposed on juvenile defendants.6 One set of 
laws that may be subject to the Court’s Miller analysis are those that impose 
lengthy mandatory sentence enhancements on juveniles who commit gang-
related crimes.7 Under California’s Street Terrorism Enforcement and Preven-
tion (STEP) Act, for instance, juveniles who commit felonies as part of a crim-
inal street gang are subject to term-of-years sentence enhancements when tried 
in the adult system.8 One consequence of this approach to gang violence is that 
juvenile offenders can now face heavy jail sentences for committing crimes 
connected to gang activity.9 
The STEP Act’s gang enhancements implicate the Miller Court’s concern 
that harsh sentencing schemes might fail to account for developmental differ-
                                                                                                                           
 4 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (discussing scientific research that 
explains how children are cognitively different than adults); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 
(2005) (explaining how developmental differences between juveniles and adults make juveniles less 
culpable for their actions than adults). 
 5 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–64. This more rigorous approach is often referred to as a “cate-
gorical analysis” because the Court will make general rules relating to the category of crime or of-
fender to which a sentence may be applied. See infra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. This ap-
proach, typically reserved for death penalty cases, can be contrasted with the traditional term-of-years 
Eighth Amendment analysis, which focuses on the circumstances surrounding the specific crime, as 
well as an individual’s attributes, to decide if the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the under-
lying crime. See infra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
 6 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466–67 (explaining that the holding is tied to the harshness of manda-
tory LWOP); Douglas A. Berman, Graham and Miller and the Eighth Amendment’s Uncertain Fu-
ture, 27 CRIM. JUST. 19, 23 (2013) (explaining that after Miller it is hard to predict how far the Court 
will be willing to expand the use of its categorical analysis); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 69–70 
(explaining that LWOP is similar to the death penalty); Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (explaining that the 
harshness of the death penalty makes it deserving of extra attention under the Eighth Amendment). 
 7 See infra notes 146–186 and accompanying text (discussing how one statute that imposes 
lengthy mandatory sentence enhancements for juveniles who commit gang-related activities impli-
cates Miller); see also Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act, CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 186.22 (West 2012) (amended 2013) (imposing lengthy mandatory sentence enhancements for juve-
niles who commit gang-related activities). 
 8 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22. 
 9 See Sara Lynn Van Hofwegen, Note, Unjust and Ineffective: A Critical Look at California’s STEP 
Act, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 679, 696 (2009) (explaining that juveniles make up a large percentage of 
gang members and that the STEP Act imposes lengthy sentences on gang members); see, e.g., People v. 
Delatorre, No. C052953, 2008 WL 748433, at *1, *18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (demonstrating how the 
STEP Act has been applied to one juvenile offender). 
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ences between juveniles and adults.10 In Miller, the Court explained that juve-
nile offenders are less culpable than adults because: (1) they are less able to 
assess risk; (2) they are more susceptible to outside influences; and (3) they do 
not have a fully developed character.11 The gang setting magnifies all of these 
concerns.12 Accordingly, Miller’s categorical Eighth Amendment analysis 
should be extended to review the STEP Act’s gang enhancements.13 
 After applying the categorical analysis used in Miller, the Court should 
hold that the STEP Act’s gang enhancements are unconstitutional when applied 
to any juvenile.14 The Categorical Eighth Amendment analysis is typically 
used to review the application of capital sentences to certain categories of of-
fenders or types of crimes.15 In reviewing a sentence under this analysis, the 
Court normally examines: (1) objective factors (e.g., the national consensus 
regarding the punishment); and (2) subjective factors (e.g., the penological 
objectives of the punishment) to decide if the sentence is proportional to the 
crime committed, as required by the Eighth Amendment.16 In Miller, the Court 
sidestepped the objective analysis after classifying the challenge of the appli-
cation of mandatory LWOP sentences to juveniles as procedural, allowing the 
Court to rest its holding almost entirely on the subjective prong of the analy-
sis.17 A challenge to the gang enhancements would be considered procedural 
because the Court—rather than striking down a type of punishment all togeth-
er—would only be reviewing the procedure used for applying such a sen-
                                                                                                                           
 10 See infra notes 146–186 and accompanying text (explaining how the STEP Act’s gang en-
hancements implicate the Miller Court’s concerns). 
 11 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 12 See infra notes 150–171 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 146–186 and accompanying text. 
 14 Compare Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (observing that penological objectives do not justify the 
application of mandatory LWOP sentences to juveniles because of their developmental deficiencies), 
and Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–74 (observing that penological objectives do not justify the application 
of LWOP sentences to juveniles who committed non-homicide crimes), with infra notes 225–279 and 
accompanying text (illustrating how penological objectives do not justify the application of gang en-
hancements to juveniles). 
 15 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 80. 
 16 See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 61; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002); see also Penry 
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (“The 
clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the 
country's legislatures . . . [and] data concerning the actions of sentencing juries.”); Coker v. Georgia, 
433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (“[T]he attitude of state legislatures and sentencing juries do not wholly 
determine this controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be 
brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amend-
ment.”). 
 17 See 132 S. Ct. at 2471; infra notes 211–219 and accompanying text (explaining the factors the 
Court considers to determine if a challenge is procedural). 
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tence.18 Therefore, the Court should focus its analysis of the enhancements on 
the subjective prong.19 In light of the unique developmental forces at play for 
juvenile offenders, the Court should hold that penological objectives do not 
justify the application of gang enhancements to juvenile offenders.20 
This Note assesses the constitutionality of gang enhancements as applied 
to juveniles in light of the Court’s evolving Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence.21 Part I explains how Miller lays a new framework for assessing juve-
nile culpability and punishments.22 This Part also explains that the Court has 
demonstrated a willingness to extend its recognition of the differences between 
juveniles and adults beyond its review of the harshest sentencing schemes.23 
Part II provides an overview of the gang problem in the United States and ex-
plains the basic components of gang enhancement legislation.24 It further ex-
plains why the categorical Eighth Amendment framework applied in Miller 
should be extended to a review of the STEP Act’s gang enhancements as ap-
plied to juvenile offenders.25 Finally, Part III applies the Miller framework to 
gang enhancements, concluding that the application of gang enhancements to 
juvenile offenders should be held unconstitutional.26 
I. MILLER: JUVENILES’ DIMINISHED CULPABILITY GIVES RISE  
TO A CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS 
Miller followed closely in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision 
in Graham v. Florida, which held that juveniles could not be sentenced to 
LWOP for non-homicide crimes, and its 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons, 
which struck down the death penalty for juveniles.27 Taken together, these cas-
es show a growing recognition that juvenile offenders are categorically less 
culpable than adults and that this difference should be appropriately reflected 
in their punishments.28 In Miller, the Court employed a new form of Eighth 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See infra notes 211–219 and accompanying text (illustrating that a challenge to gang enhance-
ments satisfies the factors indicative of a procedural challenge). 
 19 See infra notes 200–224 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court should minimize the 
importance of national consensus in a challenge to the STEP Act). 
 20 See infra notes 225–279 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 27–279 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 27–120 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 106–120 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 121–186 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 146–186 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 187–279 and accompanying text. 
 27 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460; Graham, 560 U.S. at 74–75; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
 28 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460; Graham, 560 U.S. at 74–75; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
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Amendment analysis, which incorporated concerns about juveniles’ diminished 
culpability, to review the mandatory LWOP sentencing statutes at issue.29 
Normally, term-of-years sentences, such as LWOP, are reviewed on a case-by-
case basis to determine only if the punishment was grossly disproportionate to 
the underlying offense—a highly deferential standard.30 In Miller, however, 
the Court reviewed a term-of-years sentencing scheme under a categorical ap-
proach.31 The categorical approach assesses the constitutionality of applying 
the sentencing practice to any juvenile offenders—not just those in the particu-
lar case.32 This approach applies the more rigorous constitutional review that 
the Court has traditionally reserved only for challenges to capital sentences.33 
This Part discusses how the Miller Court’s use of the categorical approach 
to Eighth Amendment challenges allowed it to strike down the use of mandato-
ry LWOP sentencing for juvenile offenders.34 Section A explains how the 
Court expanded the categorical Eighth Amendment analysis beyond the con-
text of capital punishment.35 Section B illustrates how the Miller Court applied 
the categorical analysis to hold that mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles 
are unconstitutional.36 Finally Section C explains that the Court has demon-
strated a willingness to continue expanding its recognition of the differences 
between juveniles and adults beyond cases involving capital punishment and 
mandatory LWOP sentences.37 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Miller, 132 S. Ct at 2463–64 (explaining that this new analysis stemmed from capital sen-
tence cases); Berman, supra note 6, at 23 (arguing that Miller and Graham adopted this analysis from 
capital cases); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 80–81 (explaining that Graham first expanded this 
type of analysis beyond the death penalty context). 
 30 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 21 (2003) (plurality opinion) (explaining that successful 
challenges to sentences are rare outside the context of capital punishment cases); Barkow, supra note 
2, at 49 (“Before Graham, it had been almost three decades since the Court had found a noncapital 
sentence unconstitutional . . . .”); Markel, supra note 2, at 63; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 80. 
 31 See 132 S. Ct. at 2463–64; Berman, supra note 6, at 23. 
 32 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463; Barkow, supra note 2, at 49. 
 33 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (explaining how this analysis has been used in the past); Gra-
ham, 560 U.S. at 60–61 (explaining that the Court had not previously addressed a challenge to a par-
ticular type of sentence as it applies to a whole class, except in the context of the death penalty); Bar-
kow, supra note 2, at 49 (explaining the differences between the analysis traditionally used to review 
capital sentences and the analysis used to review term-of-years sentences); Steiker & Steiker, supra 
note 2, at 80–81 (explaining that Graham articulated a new type of Eighth Amendment analysis which 
looks categorically to determine if a punishment is constitutional when applied to juveniles as a class). 
 34 See infra notes 38–120 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 38–77 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 78–105 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 106–120 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Categorical Approach to Eighth Amendment Analysis 
Like all forms of punishment, the LWOP sentences reviewed in Miller 
were subject to the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “excessive sanc-
tions.”38 This constrains the power to punish because it requires sentences to 
be proportionate to their underlying crimes.39 The Eighth Amendment analysis 
employed by the Court generally varies depending on whether the challenged 
sentence is a capital sentence or a term-of-years sentence.40 In challenges to 
term-of-years sentences, the Court overturns only sentences that are grossly 
disproportionate to the underlying offense.41 Challenges to capital offenses, 
however, are reviewed categorically to determine if the sentence is appropri-
ately applied either to a class of offenders or a type of crime.42 The Court tradi-
tionally justified its two different approaches to the Eighth Amendment by em-
phasizing the severity of the death penalty as compared to other sentences.43 
Graham changed this analysis, applying the death penalty analysis to a term-
of-years sentence.44 The Graham Court held that LWOP sentences could not 
be given to juveniles for non-homicide crimes.45 Miller extended this new 
analysis, using the categorical approach to closely review a term-of-years sen-
tence (mandatory LWOP) as applied to juvenile homicide offenders.46 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 560). In Miller, the Court reviewed 
the convictions of fourteen-year-olds Kuntrell Jackson and Evan Miller. Id. at 2461–63. Both minors 
had been tried as adults and, after being found guilty of homicide, were sentenced to LWOP as a min-
imum sentence. Id. at 2462–63. Jackson was found guilty of capital felony murder and aggravated 
robbery after he and a group of boys attempted to rob a video store. Id. at 2461. Miller killed an adult 
neighbor (his mother’s drug dealer) after robbing him of three hundred dollars and beating him with a 
baseball bat. Id. at 2462. The neighbor died when Miller and a friend burned down his trailer in an 
effort to cover up their crime. Id. 
 39 Id. at 2463; Graham, 560 U.S. at 59; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311. 
 40 See Barkow, supra note 2, at 49; Markel, supra note 2, at 63; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, 
at 80. 
 41 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 59–60; Ewing, 538 U.S. at 21 (plurality opinion); Barkow, supra note 
2, at 49; Markel, supra note 2, at 63; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 80. 
 42 Graham, 560 U.S. at 60–61; Barkow, supra note 2, at 49; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 
81; see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (holding that the death penalty is unconstitu-
tional when imposed for a non-homicide crime); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (holding that the death penal-
ty cannot be given to offenders below a certain intellectual function). 
 43 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (“Proportionality review is one of several 
respects in which we have held that ‘death is different,’ and have imposed protections that the Consti-
tution nowhere else provides.”); Barkow, supra note 2, at 49; Markel, supra note 2, at 63. 
 44 Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; see Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 80 
(explaining how Graham changed the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis). 
 45 560 U.S. at 74–75. 
 46 See 132 S. Ct. at 2463–64 (explaining its Eighth Amendment precedent and implying that it 
would follow the approach traditionally used in reviewing capital sentences); Berman, supra note 6, at 
22–23 (arguing that Miller created a new type of Eighth Amendment procedural challenge); see also, 
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When the Court reviews a challenge to a noncapital sentence, it generally 
assesses all of the circumstances of the case to determine if the punishment is 
grossly disproportionate to the underlying offense.47 This approach compares 
the gravity of the sentence to the particular circumstances of the defendant’s 
crime.48 The proportionality test is met as long as the state has a “reasonable 
basis” to believe that the sentence is supported by penological objectives.49 For 
instance, in 2003, in Ewing v. California, the Supreme Court upheld a sentence 
of twenty-five years to life that was given to a repeat offender who attempted 
to steal three golf clubs.50 This sentence was given under California’s three 
strikes law, which imposes lengthy sentences on repeat offenders.51 In Ewing, 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor explained how reluctant the Court is to find that 
a sentence is grossly disproportionate to the underlying crimes, explaining that 
the test would be satisfied only in extreme circumstances, such as “if a legisla-
ture made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.”52 
Challenges to capital sentences, however, have been far more likely to suc-
ceed than challenges to noncapital sentences.53 When reviewing capital sentenc-
es, a court’s Eighth Amendment analysis does not focus on the specific defend-
ant’s case, but follows categorical rules limiting either the nature of the offenses 
or the category of defendants to which the death penalty may be applied.54 For 
example, the Court has decided that the death penalty is disproportionate and 
thus unconstitutional when imposed for non-homicidal crimes or when imposed 
on defendants with an especially low level of intelligence.55 In determining 
whether to make a broad categorical rule, the Court considers whether objective 
                                                                                                                           
e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 60–61 (first adopting this type of approach); Barkow, supra note 2, at 49 
(explaining how Graham changed traditional Eighth Amendment analysis). 
 47 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 60–61; Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Propor-
tionality, and Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW & 
INEQ. 263, 296 (2013); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 80. 
 48 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 59–60; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 49 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (plurality opinion) (“We do not sit as a ‘superlegislature’ to second-
guess [states’] policy choices.”); Barkow, supra note 2, at 49. 
 50 538 U.S. at 28, 30–31 (plurality opinion); see Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 80 (explaining 
how difficult it is to win an Eighth Amendment proportionality challenge to a noncapital sentence). 
 51 Ewing, 538, U.S. at 24 (plurality opinion); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 2012). 
 52 538 U.S. at 21 (plurality opinion); see Markel, supra note 2, at 63 (explaining how reluctant the 
Court has been to strike down noncapital sentences); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 80 (same). 
 53 Barkow, supra note 2, at 49; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 80; see, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 
578 (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing juveniles to death); Atkins, 538 U.S. at 
321 (holding that cognitively impaired offenders cannot be sentenced to death). 
 54 Graham, 560 U.S. at 60–61; Markel, supra note 2, at 63; see, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 578; 
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 413 (holding that the death penalty cannot be applied for non-homicide crimes); 
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
 55 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 413; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
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(e.g., national consensus) and subjective (e.g., penological objectives) factors 
support the application of the challenged sentence.56 The Court will generally 
find that a sentence is unconstitutional if it is not supported by national consen-
sus and penological justifications.57 When the Court adopts this categorical ap-
proach, it is more likely to overturn a challenged sentence.58 
In Roper, the Court helped set the stage to expand the use of the categorical 
approach in reviewing juvenile sentencing, holding that the Eighth Amendment 
bars the application of the death penalty to juvenile offenders.59 The Court ap-
plied the categorical analysis and held that because juveniles have a diminished 
culpability, traditional penological objectives provided weak justification for 
applying the death penalty to juveniles.60 The Court recognized three factors that 
contribute to this diminished culpability: juvenile offenders are (1) less able to 
assess risk; (2) more susceptible to outside influences; and (3) do not have a ful-
ly developed character.61 Although the Court recognized key differences be-
tween juvenile and adult offenders, it should be noted that the Court’s willing-
ness to scrutinize the challenged sentence under the categorical analysis rested 
on the fact that it was reviewing a capital sentence—not because the sentence 
was issued to a juvenile.62 
In Graham, the Court built on Roper’s recognition of juveniles’ dimin-
ished culpability, holding that juveniles who commit non-homicidal crimes 
cannot be sentenced to LWOP.63 This was significant because it was the first 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 61; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312. 
 57 See Barkow, supra note 2, at 49 (explaining the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis). 
 58 See id. (explaining the two tracks of Eighth Amendment analysis and highlighting the differ-
ences between them). 
 59 543 U.S. at 568, 578–79. The Court reconsidered its 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, in 
which the Supreme Court held that the death penalty was unconstitutional when applied to defendants 
who committed their crimes at age sixteen or below. Id. at 555–56; see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 
U.S. 361, 380 (1989). The Roper Court reasoned that “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society” compelled the Court to rethink its holding in Stanford and revise the 
age to 18. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560–61. 
 60 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; see Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460 (observing the diminished culpability of 
juveniles); Graham, 560 U.S. at 61, 71–74 (same). 
 61 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70 (“These differences render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile 
falls among the worst offenders.”). The Court highlighted that these are the precise reasons that juve-
niles are not entrusted with important societal responsibilities, such as voting, serving on juries, or 
getting married without parental consent. Id. at 569. By stating that juveniles’ characters are not fully 
formed, the Court meant that juveniles are still forming their identity, and even those who commit 
violent crimes at a young age can grow up to be moral, law abiding citizens. See id. at 570. 
 62 See id. at 568; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 80. 
 63 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 74–75; Barkow, supra note 2, at 49; Markel, supra note 2, at 63; 
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 80–81. The defendant in Graham was first arrested at age sixteen 
after attempting to rob a restaurant with three young friends. 560 U.S. at 52. After this first offense, 
Graham was released on probation by a judge who was willing to offer him a second chance. Id. at 54. 
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time the Court was willing to overturn a noncapital sentence without a show-
ing of gross disproportionality between the sentence and the underlying 
crime.64 The Court’s willingness to categorize the challenge in this way, how-
ever, was tied to the Court’s belief that juveniles are categorically less culpable 
than adult offenders.65 In addition, the Court’s willingness to extend the cate-
gorical analysis was also linked to the type of crime the defendants had com-
mitted.66 Because they were reviewing a LWOP sentence for a non-homicide 
crime, the Court explained that “when compared to an adult murderer, a juve-
nile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral 
culpability” based on the twin factors of the juvenile’s age and the nature of 
the crime committed.67 Adhering to this notion of twice diminished culpability, 
the Court reviewed the challenged sentence with the same critical eye it had 
previously reserved only for capital sentences.68 
The Miller Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not allow juve-
niles to be sentenced to mandatory LWOP sentences, even where they commit-
ted homicide offenses.69 Miller therefore expanded the categorical analysis to 
review juvenile sentences to cases in which only a single Graham factor—the 
juvenile’s age—demonstrated the offender’s diminished culpability.70 Reflect-
ing on Roper and Graham, the Miller Court reiterated that juveniles are cate-
gorically less culpable than adult offenders because of developmental factors.71 
Their diminished culpability, the Court held, justified close scrutiny of the 
mandatory LWOP sentencing scheme at issue in the case.72 The Court drew 
                                                                                                                           
Shortly after being released, Graham was an accomplice in a series of home invasion robberies. Id. at 
54–55. In his second trial, the judge sentenced him to the maximum term: life imprisonment plus 
fifteen years, without parole. Id. at 57. 
 64 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 61 (implying that the Court applied a new type of Eighth Amendment 
analysis); Markel, supra note 2, at 63; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 81. The Court’s willingness 
to use this approach may have rested in part on how the parties framed the challenge. Barkow, supra 
note 2, at 49–50 (arguing that after Graham, whether or not categorical analysis is applied depends on 
“whether a defendant frames his challenge in categorical or case-specific terms.”); see Graham, 560 
U.S. at 61. But see id. at 103 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s new practice of allow-
ing a categorical challenge outside of the death penalty context has no natural stopping point). 
 65 Barkow, supra note 2, at 50; see Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (demonstrating that the Court recog-
nized three differences between juvenile and adult offenders). 
 66 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 69. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 60–61; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 81. 
 69 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–64. 
 70 See id. at 2469 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 69). 
 71 Id. at 2463–65. 
 72 Id. at 2464. 
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these distinctions from scientific studies that indicated fundamental differences 
in brain and psychological development between adults and children.73 
The Miller Court’s decision to apply a categorical analysis also rested, in 
part, on the Court’s recognition of the severity of LWOP.74 The Court drew 
comparisons between LWOP and the death penalty, focusing on the fact that 
both sentences leave the offender with no real hope of returning to normal 
life.75 The impact of LWOP is especially severe when given to juvenile offend-
ers because juvenile offenders will spend, on average, a much greater percent-
age of their life in prison than adult offenders facing LWOP.76 This analysis 
illustrates that the Court borrowed the individualized sentencing consideration 
normally applied in death penalty cases because of the similarities between 
that punishment and LWOP.77 
B. In Miller, the Challenged Sentence Was Unconstitutional Under  
the Categorical Analysis 
After establishing that juveniles have diminished culpability, the Miller 
Court extended Graham’s categorical Eighth Amendment analysis to juveniles 
convicted of homicide crimes and held that mandatory LWOP sentences for 
juveniles are unconstitutional.78 Under the categorical approach, the Court ba-
ses its determination of whether a punishment is proportional on (1) objective 
indicia of societal standards, as well as (2) a subjective examination of whether 
it meets a penological justification.79 In Miller, the Court’s holding relied al-
most entirely on the subjective prong of this analysis.80  
                                                                                                                           
 73 Id. at 2464 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70); see Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70 (citing Jeffrey 
Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 
339, 350 (1992); Lawrence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: 
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSY-
CHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)). See generally ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS 
(1968) (explaining how the personality traits of juveniles change over time). 
 74 132 S. Ct. at 2466–67. 
 75 Id. at 2466; see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 70 (noting that the emotional impact of LWOP is 
elevated because there is no realistic chance of restoration). 
 76 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466; see Graham, 560 U.S. at 70–71 (“A 16-year-old and a 75-year-old 
each sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in name only.”). See generally 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHEN I DIE . . . THEY’LL SEND ME HOME (2012), available at http://www.
hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/crd0112webwcover.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SNV6-VWLN 
(discussing the effects of LWOP on juvenile defendants). 
 77 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467–68. 
 78 See id. at 2464, 2468–69; Barkow, supra note 2, at 49; Berman, supra note 6, at 23. 
 79 See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312. The Court makes determinations of proportionality in light of 
the changing moral views of society. See id. at 311–12. 
 80 See 132 S. Ct. at 2470–71 (explaining that the Court put less emphasis on the objective prong); 
Berman, supra note 6, at 24–25. 
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1. The Objective Prong: National Consensus Did Not Justify the Mandatory 
Sentencing Scheme 
Normally, a categorical Eighth Amendment analysis begins with the Court 
determining if there is a broad national consensus in favor of the sentence in 
question.81 In Miller, the states argued that the challenged scheme was not cruel 
and unusual because it was possible for juveniles to be subjected to mandatory 
LWOP sentences in many states.82 In rejecting this argument, the Court mini-
mized the importance of national consensus in informing its constitutional analy-
sis.83 The Court justified bypassing national consensus by categorizing this chal-
lenge as a procedural challenge, rather than a substantive challenge.84 The Court 
then went on to discuss that even if it considered national consensus, it would 
not be determinative in this case.85 
By classifying the challenge to the mandatory sentencing requirements as 
procedural, the Court minimized the role of national consensus in informing its 
Eighth Amendment analysis.86 The Court classified this as a procedural chal-
lenge based on two factors: (1) the challenge did not require the Court to im-
pose a categorical ban on a form of punishment, and (2) the decision flowed 
directly from precedent.87 This allowed the Court to bypass national consensus 
considerations, which had traditionally been a central factor in the Court’s cat-
egorical Eighth Amendment analysis.88 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312; see also Beth Caldwell, Twenty-Five to 
Life for Adolescent Mistakes: Juvenile Strikes as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 
581, 617 (2012) (demonstrating how national consensus might be used in a challenge to the applica-
tion of California’s three strikes program to juvenile offenders). 
 82 132 S. Ct. at 2470. 
 83 See id. at 2471–72; id. at 2490 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“What today’s decision shows is that our 
Eighth Amendment cases are no longer tied to any objective indicia of society’s standards.”); Ian P. 
Farrell, Strict Scrutiny Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 853, 854 (2013) (“[F]or 
the first time, in Miller v. Alabama, [the Court indicated] that it is poised to abandon the objective 
indicia approach.”). 
 84 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471–72; Berman, supra note 6, at 22–23. 
 85 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471–72 (illustrating that LWOP sentencing for juveniles may be an unin-
tended consequence of the interaction between two sets of statutes); see infra notes 89–91 and accom-
panying text (explaining why national consensus would not be determinative when analyzing LWOP 
sentences for juveniles). 
 86 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471–72; Berman, supra note 6, at 22–23. 
 87 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. The Court relied on its cases dealing with individual sentencing 
requirements in the death penalty context to justify drawing a distinction between procedural chal-
lenges and substantive challenges. Id. For example, in the death penalty context, the Court has by-
passed national consensus to determine what types of factors must be considered at the sentencing 
phase. See id. 
 88 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2490 (Alito, J., dissenting); Berman, supra note 6, at 22–23. 
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Alternatively, the Court held that even if the objective indicia of national 
consensus were scrutinized, they were not determinative.89 Mandatory mini-
mum sentences of LWOP, though available in many states, were applied to 
juveniles as a consequence of the intersection between statutes that allow the 
transfer of juveniles into adult courts and statutes that require LWOP for adult 
offenders.90 In this respect, the Court held that the prevalence of mandatory 
LWOP sentencing possibilities for juveniles did not reflect a national consen-
sus because it was often an unintended side effect of the interaction of the two 
sets of statutes.91 
2. The Subjective Prong: Penological Objectives Did Not Justify the 
Mandatory Sentencing Scheme 
The Miller Court’s holding, therefore, rested almost entirely on the sub-
jective prong of the traditional categorical analysis.92 Under this prong, the 
Court found that penological objectives provided only a weak justification for 
applying LWOP to juvenile defendants.93 Because of the dubious theoretical 
justification for juvenile LWOP sentences, the Court held that the mandatory 
nature of these sentences was especially troubling.94 
The penological objectives traditionally relied upon to justify punishment 
are retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.95 The Court found 
that retribution failed to justify the mandatory sentence because juveniles have a 
diminished culpability and are therefore inherently less blameworthy than other 
offenders.96 The Court also held that a deterrence theory of punishment failed to 
justify the punishment.97 Juveniles are less likely to be deterred by harsh pun-
                                                                                                                           
 89 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471–72. 
 90 Id. at 2472–73. 
 91 Id. 
 92 See id. at 2471. 
 93 Id. at 2465. 
 94 Id. at 2465–66. 
 95 Id. at 2465; see Caldwell, supra note 81, at 629–30. 
 96 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. The theory of retribution justifies punishment as a form of revenge 
and relies heavily on the “blameworthiness” of the defendant. Id.; see H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and 
Responsibility, in CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 91, 91 (S. Kadish et 
al. eds., 8th ed. 2007). 
 97 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. Deterrence justifies increasing the punishment for crimes to discour-
age illegal conduct. See id.; Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
PROCESSES, supra note 96, at 92, 92 (arguing that individuals always calculate the pleasure or pain 
associated with their actions). But see Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in 
the Formulation of Criminal Code Rules, in CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES, supra note 96, at 
93, 93 (arguing that deterrence is a weak justification for punishment because individuals do not nec-
essarily calculate effects of their actions). 
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ishments because they are less able to assess risk and adjust their behavior in 
consideration of potential punishment.98 The Miller Court next held that rehabili-
tation was insufficient to support sentencing a juvenile to mandatory LWOP be-
cause this punishment necessarily foreclosed any possibility that the offender 
could re-enter society with a changed character.99 Lastly, the Miller Court held 
that incapacitation was not a convincing justification because it is inconsistent 
with juveniles’ great capacity for change.100 
Because none of the penological objectives provided sufficient theoretical 
justification for applying LWOP to juvenile defendants, the Miller Court struck 
down the mandatory nature of the punishment.101 The Court found that the 
harshness of LWOP and its dubious theoretical justifications meant that the 
circumstances of each defendant should be carefully considered by the trial 
court before LWOP could be applied to any juvenile defendant.102 Otherwise, 
the Court held, there is too high of a risk that the sentence would be dispropor-
tionate to the underlying offense.103 
Overall, the Court’s holding that juvenile offenders are categorically less 
culpable than adults contributed heavily to its inability to find a satisfying pe-
nological justification for the mandatory sentencing scheme.104 In bypassing 
the national consensus prong of the categorical analysis, the Court emphasized 
the need for punishment to be grounded in theoretical logic that considers the 
age of the offender.105 
C. The Supreme Court Has Shown a Willingness to Differentiate Between 
Juveniles and Adults More Expansively 
After Miller, it is an open question whether the Court will be willing to 
apply this categorical approach to other types of mandatory sentences imposed 
on juvenile defendants.106 The Court has, however, recognized the importance 
                                                                                                                           
 98 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; see Arnett, supra note 73, at 350 (explaining how juveniles distort 
risk). 
 99 See 132 S. Ct. at 2465. Rehabilitation seeks to use punishment to change offenders’ future 
behavior by changing their character. See id. 
 100 See id.; see also Arnett, supra note 73, at 365–66 (explaining how juveniles’ behavior changes 
as they reach adulthood); Steinberg & Scott, supra note 73, at 6 (same). Punishment is justified under 
incapacitation theory because removing the offender makes society safer. See id.; Michael Moore, 
Law and Psychiatry, in CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES, supra note 96, at 98, 98. 
 101 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465–66. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 2466. 
 104 See id. passim (placing repeated emphasis on juvenile offenders’ diminished culpability). 
 105 Id. at 2464–65, 2471. 
 106 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 6, at 24 (speculating on whether the Court will continue to rely 
so heavily on penological justifications for punishment); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 81 (ques-
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of age for purposes other than the application of the death penalty or LWOP to 
juvenile offenders.107 For example, the Court has considered the defendant’s 
age a relevant factor when analyzing issues surrounding Miranda rights and 
the felony murder rule.108 
 In 2011, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that age is 
an important consideration in determining whether a defendant is in custody 
for purposes of Miranda rights.109 Although the Supreme Court decided J.D.B. 
before Miller, the Court’s holding demonstrates its increasing willingness to 
treat juveniles categorically differently than adults.110 The J.D.B. Court relied 
on the scientific analysis in Graham, holding that a juvenile’s age is relevant to 
the Miranda custody analysis because a juvenile faced with custodial interro-
gation may be more likely than an adult to feel pressure to answer questions.111 
The Court held that juveniles should be treated differently than adults because 
their decision-making skills are less developed, and they are more susceptible 
to pressure from others.112 Thus, J.D.B. demonstrates the Court’s willingness 
to view juveniles as categorically different than adults for purposes other than 
assessing whether they are deserving of the harshest forms of punishment.113 
Similarly, Justice Stephen Breyer’s concurrence in Miller indicates that 
the majority’s reasoning could justify a categorical approach to reviewing situ-
ations in which the felony murder rule is applied to juveniles.114 Justice Brey-
                                                                                                                           
tioning whether the Court’s categorical approach in Graham might be more broadly applied in the 
future). 
 107 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475–76 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing how age is relevant in 
the context of the felony murder rule); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403–05 (2011) 
(discussing how age is relevant when analyzing Miranda rights); see also Caldwell, supra note 81, at 
606 (arguing that the Court has shown a willingness to apply Graham broadly). 
 108 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475–76 (Breyer, J., concurring); see, e.g., J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403–05; 
see also Francine T. Sherman, Justice for Girls: Are We Making Progress?, 28 CRIM. JUST. 9, 12 
(2013) (noting how the consideration of developmental factors has also been incorporated by juvenile 
justice systems into their policies and practices). 
 109 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403–05; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“[T]he 
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial 
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to 
secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”). 
 110 See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403–05 (discussing the importance of age for the purposes of the 
Court’s Miranda analysis); Caldwell, supra note 81, at 609 (“Given the broad approach the Supreme 
Court has taken, it seems likely that the Could would respond favorably to extending Graham to apply 
to other sentencing practices involving juveniles.”). 
 111 Id. at 2403. 
 112 Id. The Court held that these psychological considerations apply even to juveniles who might 
have had prior encounters with law enforcement and may know their rights in the context of a custo-
dial interrogation. Id. at 2404. 
 113 See id. at 2399, 2403–05; Caldwell, supra note 81, at 604–05. 
 114 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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er’s concurrence would have held that sentencing a juvenile to LWOP for felo-
ny murder violates the Eighth Amendment.115 
The felony murder rule traditionally allows prosecutors to charge all par-
ticipants in a felony with murder if a murder occurs during the commission of 
the crime.116 The doctrine of transferred intent, which allows a defendant’s 
intent to commit any felony to satisfy the intent requirement for murder, justi-
fies the felony murder rule.117 As Justice Breyer noted, however, transferred 
intent assumes that a person engaging in felonious conduct understands the 
additional risks of his or her behavior, including the risk that a co-conspirator 
could kill someone.118 The majority’s recognition that juveniles have an im-
paired ability to recognize the risks associated with their behavior, Justice 
Breyer wrote, calls this assumption into question for juveniles.119 Therefore, 
Justice Breyer concluded that the felony murder rule should not apply to juve-
niles because of their inability to fully appreciate the riskiness of their con-
duct.120 
II. THE GANG PROBLEM IN AMERICA AND STATUTORY ATTEMPTS TO 
DETER CRIMINAL GANG ACTIVITY 
Although the Supreme Court now recognizes juveniles’ diminished cul-
pability, anti-gang initiatives still attach sizable sentence enhancements that are 
applied without consideration of the offender’s age.121 In 1988, the California 
legislature passed the STEP Act in an effort to combat the growing influence of 
criminal street gangs.122 Among other things, the STEP Act includes a gang 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 2476. 
 117 Id. 
 118 See id. at 2476–77. 
 119 See id. In the case of Kuntrell Jackson, Justice Breyer would have held that an LWOP sen-
tence violates Jackson’s Eighth Amendment rights because he did not kill the victim and was found 
guilty under a statute that did not require the jury to find that he intended to kill the victim. Id. at 2477 
(explaining that the statute only required the jury to find that he acted with “extreme indifference to 
the value of human life”). 
 120 Id. at 2476. Judge Breyer’s conclusion lends support to the prediction that some members of 
the Court might be willing to broaden Miller’s categorical approach to the Eighth Amendment by 
calling into question whether juveniles can be charged with certain types of crimes. Id. (illustrating 
that Justice Breyer is particularly concerned with the harshness of LWOP). Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
joined Justice Breyer’s opinion. Id. at 2475. 
 121 See Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 
(West 2012) (amended 2013) (demonstrating California’s legislative effort to combat gangs through 
gang enhancements); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (recognizing the factors that 
contribute to juvenile’s diminished culpability); supra notes 38–77 and accompanying text (explaining 
how the Court has treated juveniles differently than adults for Eighth Amendment purposes). 
 122 2011 Cal. Stat. 5594. 
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enhancement component, whereby prosecutors can seek to have a defendant’s 
sentence increased by a term of years if the underlying crime was committed to 
benefit a criminal street gang.123 Additionally, federal legislation (though rarely 
prosecuted) mimics California’s STEP Act gang enhancement, as do many 
state statutes.124 Today, juveniles facing felony charges in California and other 
states risk heavy sentences if their crime was committed as part of a criminal 
street gang.125 
This Part provides as brief overview of the STEP Act and explains how its 
gang enhancement provisions implicate the Supreme Court’s analysis in the 
2012 case Miller v. Alabama.126 Section A explains how the Step Act’s en-
hancements are applied.127 Section B illustrates why the Miller framework 
should be utilized to categorically review the application of gang enhance-
ments to juvenile offenders.128 This is because the gang setting magnifies the 
developmental differences between juveniles and adults that were highlighted 
in Miller and the mandatory nature of the enhancements gives sentencing 
judges very little discretion.129 
                                                                                                                           
 123 PENAL § 186.22. The Act also includes provisions that require a sentence of an indeterminate 
life term, with a minimum of seven or fifteen years to be served before the offender is eligible for 
parole. Id. § 186.22(b)(4); see People v. Sengpadychith, 27 P.3d 739, 742 (Cal. 2001) (clarifying that 
this is not an enhancement to the underlying penalty, but rather the minimum amount of time offend-
ers must serve before they are eligible for parole). 
 124 See, e.g., Criminal Street Gang Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 521 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-74-108 
(2013) (providing enhanced penalties for “violence while acting in concert with two or more other 
persons”); IOWA CODE §§ 723A.1–2 (2013) (criminalizing active participation or membership in a 
criminal street gang); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1403 (2013) (providing for a gang enhancement); 
MINN. STAT. § 609.229 (2013) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-404 (2013) (same); Beth Bjerre-
gaard, The Constitutionality of Anti-Gang Legislation, 21 CAMPBELL L. REV. 31, 32 & n.10 (1999) 
(explaining that California was the first state to pass a gang enhancement statute and that many states 
have followed); Rodrigo M. Caruco, Note, In the Trenches of Florida’s War on Gangs: A Framework 
for Prosecuting Florida’s Anti-Gang Sentence Enhancement Provision, 14 BARRY L. REV. 97, 114–
119 (2010) (comparing the gang enhancement provisions of several states); Jennifer E. Fleming, Note, 
Your Honor, I Seen Him with That Gang: The Constitutionality of the Federal Criminal Street Gang 
Statute in the Wake of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 249, 251 (2009) (ex-
plaining the federal statute). 
 125 See Van Hofwegen, supra note 9, at 696. In 2007, the California legislature declared a “war on 
gangs,” in part increasing the likelihood that prosecutors will seek to use the STEP Act’s gang en-
hancements. See id. at 692. 
 126 See infra notes 130–186 and accompanying text. 
 127 See infra notes 130–145 and accompanying text. 
 128 See infra notes 146–186 and accompanying text. 
 129 See infra notes 146–186 and accompanying text. 
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A. Overview of the STEP Act 
The gang enhancement is one component of the STEP Act.130 It allows for 
a term-of-years sentence enhancement if: (1) the defendant is convicted of a 
felony; (2) the felony was commissioned for the benefit of, at the direction of, 
or in association with a criminal street gang; and (3) the defendant possessed 
the specific intent to further the gang’s purpose.131 Federal law similarly pro-
vides for enhanced sentencing of up to ten years if a defendant commits one of 
several named offenses while participating in a criminal street gang under the 
Criminal Street Gang Statute (“CSGS”).132 Because the CSGS is not utilized to 
prosecute gang-related offenses as frequently as the STEP Act and other simi-
lar state statutes are, this Note focuses on the STEP Act.133 
The gang enhancement component of the STEP Act applies if the defendant 
is convicted of an underlying felony.134 Accordingly, the statute allots enhance-
ments of five years for “serious” felonies and ten years for “violent” felonies.135 
The Act also enumerates specific felonies for which the enhancement is especial-
ly severe.136 These crimes include home invasions, robberies, carjackings, and 
                                                                                                                           
 130 See Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b) 
(West 2012) (amended 2013). Another component of the STEP Act criminalizes active participation in a 
criminal street gang, which is punishable by up to three years in prison. Id. Prosecutions under this compo-
nent of the STEP Act are rare. Erin R. Yoshino, Note, California’s Criminal Gang Enhancement, 18 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 117, 118–19 (2008). 
 131 See PENAL § 186.22(b). 
 132 See 18 U.S.C. § 521 (2012); Fleming, supra note 124, at 262 (explaining the enhancement 
provision of the CSGS). 
 133 See Fleming, supra note 124, at 262 (explaining that prosecutors rarely use the GSGS); infra 
notes 134–186 (discussing the STEP Act and why it implicates Miller). 
 134 PENAL § 186.22(b). The enhancement requires that the underlying crime was commissioned 
for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang; a crime committed 
by gang members outside the context of the gang would not satisfy the requirement. See id.; Osika v. 
Patrick, 472 F. App’x 441, 443 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the defendant does not actually need to 
be a member of the gang to be subject to the gang enhancements); People v. Abillar, 244 P.3d 1062, 
1072 (Cal. 2010) (“[I]t is conceivable that several gang members could commit a crime together, yet 
be on a frolic and detour unrelated to the gang.”); People v. Arroyas, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 382 (Ct. 
App. 2002) (explaining that the enhancements do not apply to misdemeanors that turn into felonies by 
virtue of enhanced penalty provisions found elsewhere in the Act). The enhancement also requires that 
the defendant possessed “the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by 
gang members.” PENAL § 186.22(b). Accordingly, the prosecution must prove that the defendant 
intended to commit the underlying crime and knew that his or her accomplices were members of a 
gang. See Abillar, 244 P.3d at 1075. 
 135 PENAL § 186.22(b)(1). “Serious” felonies include crimes such as mayhem, rape, and attempted 
murder. Id. § 1192.7(c). “Violent” felonies include crimes such as murder, voluntary manslaughter, 
and certain forms of rape. Id. § 667.5(c). 
 136 Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b)(4)(B) 
(West 2012) (amended 2013). 
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drive-by shootings.137 A defendant convicted of one of these felonies (assuming 
the gang requirements are met) must be sentenced to an “indeterminate term of 
life imprisonment” with a minimum term of fifteen years.138 Similarly, for the 
crime of extortion, the gang enhancement provides for an indeterminate term of 
life imprisonment with a minimum term of seven years.139 For all other felonies, 
the Act provides enhancements of two to four years.140 Lastly, if the crime was 
commissioned in the vicinity of a school, it is considered an aggravating factor 
in determining the appropriate enhancement.141 
As a result of the STEP Act’s gang enhancement provision, juvenile of-
fenders face heightened sentences for criminal activity that satisfies the stat-
ute’s requirements.142 Although there is sometimes leeway for the judge to 
choose the appropriate level of enhancement, for certain crimes, sentences are 
increased by a term of years without judicial discretion.143 Thus, the conse-
quences of committing a felony in association with a gang could be grave, es-
pecially for juveniles who are often the subject of gang recruitment.144 This 
danger is magnified in light of Proposition 21, a referendum passed by Cali-
fornia voters in March 2000 that makes it easier for prosecutors to try juvenile 
cases in adult court.145 
                                                                                                                           
 137 Id.; see id. § 246 (shooting at an inhabited house, punishable by up to seven years); id. § 12022.55 
(discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle in commission of a felony, punishable by up to five, six, or ten 
years). 
 138 Id. § 186.22(b)(4)(B). 
 139 Id. § 186.22(b)(4)(C). 
 140 Id. § 186.22(b)(1)(A). 
 141 Id. § 186.22(b)(2). 
 142 See Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b) 
(West 2012) (amended 2013) (explaining the enhancements). 
 143 See id. Judges have discretion to choose between an enhancement of two, three, or four years 
for felonies classified under section (b)(1). Id. § 186.22(b)(1)(A). Judges have no discretion when 
issuing enhancements for serious or violent felonies, and must enhance the sentences for these crimes 
by five years and ten years, respectively. Id. § 186.22(b)(1)(B)–(C). Finally, for certain crimes, the 
judge must set the sentence at an indeterminate life sentence with a minimum term of seven or fifteen 
years, depending on the crime committed. Id. § 186.22(b)(4)(A)–(C). 
 144 See id. § 186.22; Van Hofwegen, supra note 9, at 696 (explaining the relationship between age 
and gang membership). 
 145 See 2000 Cal. Stat. A-263; Jennifer Taylor, California’s Proposition 21: A Case of Juvenile 
Injustice, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 983, 984 (2002) (explaining the changes made by Proposition 21). Prop-
osition 21, otherwise known as the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Initiative, makes it 
more likely that a juvenile will be tried as an adult. See Taylor, supra at 990–91. This is significant 
because juvenile courts in California only have the authority to order offenders to be held until age 
twenty-five, whereas adult courts can sentence them to full criminal sentences, including life sentenc-
es. Id. at 990. Prior to Proposition 21, a juvenile could be tried as an adult only if the prosecutor could 
prove that the juvenile’s actions met certain qualifications or that the juvenile was unsuited to be tried 
as a child. Joshua Tiffee, Note, Addressing Misconceptions: The Real Effects of Proposition 21, 5 
U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 33, 34, 36 (2000). After Proposition 21, a prosecutor can simply file a 
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B. The STEP Act Implicates the Miller Court’s Concerns 
The STEP Act could warrant application of a categorical analysis because 
it highlights two of the Miller Court’s primary concerns.146 First, the STEP Act 
targets juvenile offenders who commit crimes in a context where the factors 
leading to diminished juvenile culpability are magnified.147 Second, the gang 
enhancement sentencing scheme resembles the challenged sentencing scheme 
in Miller because it requires courts to impose harsh sentences on juvenile of-
fenders without accounting for mitigating factors associated with their age.148 
Therefore, applying gang enhancements to juveniles implicates Miller’s con-
cern that juvenile sentencing will ignore the factors that make them less culpa-
ble than adults.149 
1. The Gang Setting Magnifies the Miller Court’s Concerns 
The gang setting is similar to other contexts in which the Court has ex-
tended Miller’s categorical treatment of juveniles because it is a setting that 
magnifies the three underlying differences between juveniles and adults.150 The 
three developmental differences that have a substantial impact on juvenile be-
havior are their: (1) inability to assess the riskiness of their behavior; (2) sus-
ceptibility to negative influences; and (3) the incomplete development of their 
                                                                                                                           
case against the juvenile directly in an adult criminal court without proving that the juvenile’s actions 
meet certain qualifications or that the juvenile is unsuited to be tried as a child. See id. at 35–37. The 
result of these changes is that a juvenile is now more likely to be tried in adult court, making the gang 
enhancements of the STEP Act a more serious concern for juvenile offenders. See PENAL § 186.22(b); 
Taylor, supra, at 990–91 (discussing how the Proposition 21’s reforms increase the stakes for juvenile 
offenders). 
 146 See 132 S. Ct. at 2464, 2465–66 (stating that sentencing should account for a juvenile’s dimin-
ished culpability and that lengthy sentences should not be applied in a mandatory fashion). 
 147 See id. at 2464 (discussing the factors that make juveniles less culpable than adults); Van 
Hofwegen, supra note 9, at 689–90 (noting that gang members are less culpable for their actions be-
cause of their life circumstances). 
 148 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (discussing the importance of accounting for age when applying 
an LWOP sentence to a juvenile offender); supra notes 130–145 and accompanying text (illustrating 
the various permutations of the STEP Act’s sentencing scheme); infra notes 172–186 and accompany-
ing text (explaining the mandatory nature of the STEP Act’s gang enhancements). 
 149 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466. But see Barkow, supra note 2, at 50 (arguing that the Court has 
intentionally limited its categorical analysis to LWOP sentences). 
 150 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (highlighting these three differences); Robert G. Schwartz, Age-
Appropriate Charging and Sentencing, 27 CRIM. JUST. 49, 49 (2012) (arguing that Miller represents 
“a constitutional mandate to hold juvenile offenders accountable in developmentally appropriate 
ways”); infra notes 153–171 and accompanying text (explaining how the gang setting magnifies the 
Miller Court’s concerns). 
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personality.151 Because the gang setting magnifies these weaknesses, Miller is 
especially relevant when the STEP Act’s gang enhancements are applied to 
juveniles.152 
The gang context magnifies juveniles’ inability to accurately assess the 
riskiness of their behavior.153 In Miller, the Court recognized that this differ-
ence between juveniles and adults was a product of both life experience and 
physiological differences in brain development.154 This is grounded in a grow-
ing scientific recognition that the part of the brain that assesses risk is not fully 
developed in adolescents.155 The gang setting magnifies this effect by adding 
variables to risk calculation that make it more difficult for a juvenile to make 
well-reasoned decisions.156 For example, gang membership tends to correlate 
with factors such as low self-esteem, which already make youths more likely 
to engage in antisocial behavior.157 Additionally, the promise of acceptance as 
a gang member may cause juveniles to lower their moral standards.158 Fur-
thermore, youths may gravitate toward the protection a gang offers if they are 
from an area in which gangs are prevalent.159 Finally, gang members tend to 
justify their actions by deflecting their responsibility onto others.160 
                                                                                                                           
 151 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464; infra notes 153–171 and accompanying text (providing addi-
tional support for these assertions). 
 152 See 132 S. Ct. at 2464; infra notes 153–171 and accompanying text; see also Caldwell, supra 
note 81, at 616 (arguing that the Graham framework should be applied to the application of Califor-
nia’s three strikes law to juveniles); Emily C. Keller, Constitutional Sentences for Juveniles Convicted 
of Felony Murder in the Wake of Roper, Graham, & J.D.B., 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 297, 308–09 
(2012) (arguing that the framework of Graham, Roper, and J.D.B. should be used when reviewing the 
application of the felony murder rule to juveniles). 
 153 See Emma Alleyne & Jane L. Wood, Gang Involvement: Psychological and Behavioral Char-
acteristics of Gang Members, Peripheral Youth, and Nongang Youth, 36 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 423, 
424 (2010) (providing examples of how the gang environment might contribute to juveniles’ inability 
to assess risk). 
 154 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. In a footnote, the Court noted the growing scientific consensus that 
an adolescent’s cognitive ability to avoid risk is not fully developed. Id. at 2464 n.5. 
 155 Id.; see also Arnett, supra note 73, at 350 (articulating that adolescents “distort the perceived 
risk of a given behavior in their favor”); Steinberg & Scott, supra note 73, at 5 (explaining that the 
“immediate and concrete rewards, along with the reward of peer approval, weigh more heavily in [a 
juvenile’s] decision than the abstract and temporally remote possibility of apprehension by the po-
lice,” and that “[t]he last thing that the adolescent considers is the long-term costs associated with the 
conviction of a serious crime”). 
 156 See Alleyne & Wood, supra note 153, at 424. 
 157 See id. at 425; Finn-Aage Esbensen, Preventing Adolescent Gang Involvement, JUV. JUST. 
BULL., Sept. 2000, at 1, 5. Gangs provide stability to juveniles who are looking for an identity. Al-
leyne & Wood, supra note 153, at 425. This identity is often associated with “alcohol and drug use, 
conflict, and violence.” Id. 
 158 See Alleyne & Wood, supra note 153, at 425–26. 
 159 Id. at 426. 
 160 See id. at 432. 
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The gang context also magnifies the effects of juveniles’ susceptibility to 
negative influences.161 Miller noted that juveniles are highly susceptible to 
negative influences from their peers and family and cannot control their own 
environment.162 This is especially true in the gang setting because gang mem-
bers often have more exposure to negative influences.163 For example, gang 
members often lack strong family structures and come from households that 
reinforce criminal behavior.164 Additionally, joining a gang brings juveniles 
into an environment in which peers are more likely to be engaging in delin-
quent behavior, including clashes with rival gangs.165 Furthermore, older gang 
members are likely to become role models in the gang’s social structure.166 
Thus, this reliance on older gang members increases the presence of negative 
influences in the lives of juvenile gang members.167 
Lastly, Miller differentiated juveniles from adults on the basis that their 
characters are not fully formed.168 Accordingly, Miller held that juvenile acts 
are less likely to be predictive of the offender’s future conduct.169 This remains 
true in gang settings, where juveniles often decide to terminate their participa-
tion and move on to participate in other types of peer groups.170 This willing-
ness to move away from gang activity shows that juvenile gang members have 
characters that are still forming.171 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (discussing juveniles’ susceptibility to negative influences); 
Esbensen, supra note 157, at 5 (“[T]he strongest predictors of sustained gang affiliation . . . [are] a 
high level of interaction with antisocial peers and a low level of interaction with prosocial peers.”). 
 162 132 S. Ct. at 2464; see also Arnett, supra note 73, at 354 (“It has long been recognized that 
adolescence is the time of greatest susceptibility to peer influences.”); Steinberg & Scott, supra note 
73, at 6 (explaining that “[b]ecause of their developmental immaturity, normative (i.e., ‘ordinary’) 
adolescents may respond adversely to external pressures that adults are able to resist”). 
 163 See Alleyne & Wood, supra note 153, at 424. 
 164 See id. (showing that family factors such as “poor parental management, familial criminality, 
and gang-involved family members” correlate with gang participation). 
 165 See Rachel A. Gordon et al., Antisocial Behavior and Youth Gang Membership: Selection and 
Socialization, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 55, 59 (2004). 
 166 Id. 
 167 See id. (explaining that when boys become part of a gang structure, they learn when, where, 
and how to engage in criminal behavior). 
 168 See 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 169 Id.; see also Steinberg & Scott, supra note 73, at 6 (“Only a relatively small proportion of 
adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of problem be-
havior that persist into adulthood.”). 
 170 Gordon et al., supra note 165 at 69; James C. Howell, Menacing or Mimicking? Realities of 
Youth Gangs, JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Spring 2007, at 39, 44. Delinquent activity is likely to decline after 
the juvenile leaves a gang. Gordon et al., supra note 165, at 69. 
 171 See Howell, supra note 170, at 44 (dispelling the myth that once juveniles join a gang, they are 
lost forever). 
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2. STEP Act Sentencing Is Mandatory and Ignores the Characteristics That 
Set Juveniles Apart from Adults 
The Miller framework also applies to the STEP Act’s gang enhancement 
provision because, like the statutes struck down in Miller, the gang enhance-
ment requires the imposition of substantial minimum sentences without allow-
ing judges to account for the mitigating effects of youth.172 Although the STEP 
Act is different from the statute rejected in Miller—because the STEP Act’s 
required punishment is not as harsh as LWOP—the ramifications of the gang 
enhancements can be profound.173 Under the STEP Act, judges have little dis-
cretion to consider mitigating factors related to the defendant’s age and can be 
required to impose a sentence of at least fifteen years.174 
The Miller Court explained its concern regarding mandatory sentencing 
schemes is particularly acute when the juvenile defendant is facing LWOP.175 
Concededly, some of the STEP Act’s gang enhancements increase the sentence 
for the underlying crime by only two to four years.176 Serious felonies and vio-
lent felonies, however, are enhanced by five and ten years, respectively.177 
These enhancements can more than double the maximum sentence for the un-
derlying felony.178 Likewise, certain crimes enumerated by the Act require a 
minimal sentence of at least fifteen years before the offender is eligible for pa-
                                                                                                                           
 172 See Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b) 
(West 2012) (amended 2013) (explaining how the length of the sentence enhancement is determined); Mil-
ler, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (explaining the importance of allowing a judge to consider factors related to youth 
before imposing LWOP on juveniles). 
 173 See PENAL § 186.22(b) (stating that the statute requires a minimum sentence of fifteen years); 
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466. 
 174 See PENAL §186.22(b)(4)(b); see also supra note 145 and accompanying text (explaining how 
Proposition 21 made it easier for juveniles to be tried as adults subject to these mandatory sentences). 
 175 See 132 S. Ct. at 2466; Barkow, supra note 2, at 50. 
 176 See PENAL § 186.22(b)(1)(A). 
 177 See id. § 186.22(b)(1)(B)–(C). 
 178 See Martin Baker, Stuck in the Thicket: Struggling with Interpretation and Application of 
California’s Anti-Gang STEP Act, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 101, 105 (2006) (explaining that for 
serious felonies, the maximum sentence for the underlying crime is often less than three years, but that 
the STEP Act adds an enhancement of five years, more than doubling the sentence); see Street Terror-
ism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b)(1)(B)–(C) (West 2012) 
(amended 2013); Van Hofwegen, supra note 9, at 680 (suggesting that the gang enhancements are 
often combined with other felony enhancements, resulting in a sentence that is three times as a long as 
it otherwise would have been). In addition to the underlying felony, any felony violation under section 
186.22 also counts as a strike under California’s three strikes program. Baker, supra, at 105. This 
means that a defendant convicted of an underlying felony in association with a gang could be given 
two strikes for one offense. See id. If the defendant is convicted of any subsequent felony, he or she 
would be subject to a sentence of twenty-five-years-to-life under the three strikes program. Id. 
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role.179 Although the Miller Court’s holding only addressed LWOP sentences, 
the sentences available under the STEP Act’s gang enhancements illicit similar 
concerns about the imposition of extremely lengthy sentences on juvenile of-
fenders.180 
Further, like the sentencing scheme in Miller, the STEP Act leaves little 
or no room for the judge to weigh mitigating factors associated with the de-
fendant’s youth.181 In Miller, the Court rejected the mandatory sentencing 
scheme at issue because it required the judge to impose an LWOP sentence 
without being able to consider a defendant’s status as a juvenile.182 Similarly, 
the STEP Act creates a sentencing scheme that does not allow a judge to con-
sider the defendant’s status as a juvenile.183 For example, under the violent fel-
ony provision of the gang enhancement, a judge is required to impose a ten-
year enhancement.184 The Act leaves no room for the judge to account for the 
defendant’s age.185 This lack of discretion means that the mandatory nature of 
the STEP Act’s enhancements implicates Miller.186 
                                                                                                                           
 179 See PENAL § 186.22(b)(4)(B)–(C). 
 180 Compare Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (explaining the Court’s concern with mandatory LWOP 
sentences for juveniles), with PENAL § 186.22(b) (demonstrating the severity of the gang enhance-
ments), Baker, supra note 178, at 105 (discussing the severity of the length of the enhancements), Van 
Hofwegen, supra note 9, at 680 (discussing the severity of gang enhancements), and Jason Zolle, 
Note, Transforming Juvenile Justice: Making Doctrine Out of Dicta in Graham v. Florida, 112 MICH. 
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 30, 32 (2013), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/articles/transforming-
juvenile-justice-making-doctrine-out-of-dicta-in-em-graham-v-florida-em, archived at http://perma.
cc/NH64-FEGW (explaining that there is “room for advocates to argue . . . that the holdings of [Miller 
and Graham] extend beyond the LWOP context to all sentencing for youth”). 
 181 See PENAL § 186.22(b)(1)(a) (demonstrating the mandatory nature of the gang enhancements); 
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (illustrating the Court’s concern with the mandatory nature of the sentenc-
ing scheme at issue). Proposition 21 further exacerbates this effect by increasing the likelihood that a 
juvenile will be subject to a lengthy sentence as a consequence of being tried as an adult. See supra 
note 145 and accompanying text (discussing Proposition 21). 
 182 132 S. Ct. at 2466. 
 183 See PENAL § 186.22(b) (demonstrating that there is little room for judicial discretion in deter-
mining the length of the enhancements). 
 184 See Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act, CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 186.22(b)(1)(C) (West 2012) (amended 2013); see also Baker, supra note 178, at 105 (explaining that the 
ten-year enhancement come close to tripling the maximum sentence for many of the felonies that are catego-
rized as violent). 
 185 See PENAL § 186.22(b). Enhancements may be shorter in juvenile court because juvenile 
courts can only hold offenders until age twenty-five. See Taylor, supra note 145, at 990. But see supra 
note 145 and accompanying text (explaining that Proposition 21 has made it easier for juveniles to be 
tried as adults). 
 186 Compare PENAL § 186.22(b) (demonstrating the mandatory nature of the enhancements), and 
Baker, supra note 178, at 105 (discussing the severity of the sentence enhancements), with Miller, 132 
S. Ct. at 2466 (noting the Court’s concern with sentencing schemes that impose harsh sentences to 
juveniles without allowing the judge to consider the age of the defendant). 
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III. A CATEGORICAL REVIEW OF THE STEP ACT’S GANG ENHANCEMENTS 
SUGGESTS THAT THEY VIOLATE THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
Miller v. Alabama, decided by the Supreme Court in 2012, suggests that 
mandatory gang enhancements, such as those found in California’s STEP Act, 
likely violate the Eighth Amendment when they are applied to juvenile defend-
ants.187 Miller recognized that juveniles have diminished culpability because of 
their: (1) inability to assess the risks associated with their behavior; (2) suscepti-
bility to negative influence; and (3) capacity for change.188 Importantly, the 
STEP Act applies to juveniles in a gang setting where these factors limiting their 
culpability are likely magnified.189 Furthermore, the STEP Act’s gang enhance-
ments also implicate Miller because they require judges to impose harsh sen-
tences without being able to consider a juvenile’s diminished culpability.190 
In light of these concerns about juveniles’ diminished culpability, the Mil-
ler Court held that mandatory LWOP sentences granted to juveniles are uncon-
stitutional.191 In Miller, the Court applied the categorical Eighth Amendment 
analysis traditionally used in assessing the constitutionality of the imposition 
of the death penalty.192 Because the STEP Act’s gang enhancements implicate 
the same concerns as Miller, this framework should be extended to review the 
Act as it applies to juveniles.193 
Under this categorical framework, the Court should hold that the STEP 
Act’s gang enhancements are unconstitutional when applied to juvenile of-
fenders.194 In reaching this conclusion, the Court should categorize a challenge 
to the STEP Act as procedural, allowing it to bypass the national consensus 
prong of the categorical analysis.195 Furthermore, under the subjective prong of 
                                                                                                                           
 187 See PENAL § 186.22; Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 1455, 2464, 2469 (2012) (expanding the 
reach of Eighth Amendment review of term-of-years sentences and holding that a mandatory LWOP 
sentencing scheme is unconstitutional when applied to juvenile offenders). 
 188 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 189 See supra notes 150–171 and accompanying text. 
 190 See supra notes 172–186 and accompanying text. 
 191 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 192 See id. at 2463–64; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74–75 (2010) (illustrating a simi-
lar application of the categorical analysis to a noncapital case); Berman, supra note 6, at 20–21 (dis-
cussing Graham and Miller); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 2, at 80–81 (explaining how Graham 
changed the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis). 
 193 See supra notes 146–186 and accompanying text (explaining how the STEP Act implicates 
Miller’s concerns). 
 194 See supra notes 200–279 and accompanying text. 
 195 See supra notes 200–219 and accompanying text. 
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the analysis, the Court should hold that the gang enhancements are not suffi-
ciently justified by any penological objectives.196 
This Part applies the Miller framework and concludes that the STEP Act’s 
gang enhancements are unconstitutional when applied to juveniles.197 Section 
A explains why the Court should classify this as a procedural challenge and 
therefore bypass the national consensus prong of the categorical analysis.198 
Section B explains why no penological objectives justify the application of the 
STEP Act’s gang enhancements to juveniles.199 
A. Bypassing National Consensus 
Because the challenge of the application of the STEP Act’s gang en-
hancements to juveniles would be a procedural one, the Court’s analysis 
should bypass national consensus considerations.200 Ordinarily, categorical 
Eighth Amendment analyses first turn to national consensus to determine if the 
challenged punishment is generally acceptable to society.201 Under this stand-
ard, the Supreme Court looks to a variety of factors, including the prevalence 
of legislation allowing for the type of punishment at issue, legislative intent, 
actual sentencing practices, and sometimes international norms.202 Normally, 
the Court is hesitant to strike down a sentence that is supported by national 
consensus.203 A review of national consensus could be fatal to an Eighth 
Amendment challenge to the STEP Act, as many states have enacted similar 
legislation.204 National consensus, however, is not always a major considera-
                                                                                                                           
 196 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465, 2470–71 (assessing penological objectives in light of the age of 
juvenile offenders); Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–72; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002); infra 
notes 225–279 and accompanying text. 
 197 See infra notes 200–279 and accompanying text. 
 198 See infra notes 200–224 and accompanying text. 
 199 See infra notes 225–279 and accompanying text. 
 200 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471–72 (implicitly reasoning that a challenge to mandatory LWOP 
sentences, as applied to juveniles, was procedural); infra notes 201–224 and accompanying text (illus-
trating that a challenge to the STEP Act’s gang enhancements, as applied to juveniles, is procedural). 
 201 See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 62; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312. 
 202 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471–73 (explaining the role of legislation and legislative intent); 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 62–63 (explaining the role of legislation, legislative intent, and actual sentencing 
practices); Roper v. Simons, 543 U.S. 551, 567, 575 (2005) (explaining the role of international con-
sensus). 
 203 Graham, 560 U.S. at 67 (explaining that national consensus is given “great weight”); see Rop-
er, 543 U.S. at 564; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313. But see Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2490 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Court has moved away from considering objective factors—such as national consen-
sus—as part of its Eighth Amendment analysis). 
 204 See Bjerregaard, supra note 124, at 32 & n.10, 33 (explaining that many states have followed 
California’s lead by enacting gang enhancement statutes); Caruco, supra note 124, at 114–19 (com-
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tion.205 In Miller, the Court largely sidestepped national consensus considera-
tions because the Court viewed the challenge as a procedural—as opposed to a 
substantive—one.206 Under the same reasoning, an Eighth Amendment chal-
lenge to the STEP Act should also sidestep national consensus considera-
tions.207 
In Miller, the Court avoided the hurdle of national consensus in just a few 
sentences by declaring that the Court gives less weight to factors relating to 
national consensus when the challenge is to a procedural element of a punish-
ment.208 A challenge to the STEP Act’s gang enhancements as applied to juve-
niles should also be considered procedural because: (1) the court would not be 
imposing a categorical ban on a certain type of punishment; and (2) the deci-
sion would flow directly from precedent.209 Therefore, consideration of the 
STEP Act under the categorical Eighth Amendment analysis should also side-
step consideration of national consensus.210 
A constitutional challenge to the application of gang enhancements to ju-
venile defendants would not require a categorical ban on any type of punish-
ment.211 This is because a review of the mandatory gang enhancements would 
not require the Court to ban lengthy sentences for juveniles altogether.212 Ra-
ther, a successful challenge to the gang enhancements would only require the 
Court to impose rules on the types of factors that must be considered before 
                                                                                                                           
paring the gang enhancement provisions of several states); see also Criminal Street Gang Statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 521 (2006) (providing a federal analog to California’s STEP Act). 
 205 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471–72 (placing little importance on the national consensus prong as 
part of its analysis of mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles); Farrell, supra note 83, at 901. 
 206 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471; Berman, supra note 6, at 22. 
 207 See infra notes 208–219 and accompanying text (explaining how the Miller Court bypassed 
the national consensus prong of its Eighth Amendment analysis and arguing that the same approach 
should be taken to a review of the STEP Act). 
 208 See 132 S. Ct. at 2471; Berman, supra note 6, at 22; supra note 87 and accompanying text 
(explaining how the Court determines whether a challenge is procedural). 
 209 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471; infra notes 211–219 and accompanying text. 
 210 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. Recall that the Miller Court maintained that even if national 
consensus were considered, it would be unpersuasive because the sentencing scheme at issue was an 
unintended result of the overlap of two statutes. See id. at 2471–72. Such reasoning would not apply 
to the STEP Act because the statute specifically targets juveniles. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 
(West 2012) (expressing the legislature’s intent to combat criminal street gangs); Alleyne & Wood, 
supra note 153, at 224 (explaining that juveniles between the ages of twelve and eighteen are the 
individuals at the highest risk of joining a gang). 
 211 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471; infra notes 212–215 and accompanying text. 
 212 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 (“Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of 
offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper or Graham.”); see also CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 186.22(b) (demonstrating that the gang enhancements do not affect the sentence that would 
otherwise be given for the underlying crime). 
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courts can sentence juveniles to such lengthy prison terms.213 For example, 
gang participation could be considered in sentencing, along with mitigating 
factors such as the defendant’s age.214 Thus, the Court would not be imposing a 
categorical ban on a certain type of punishment.215 
Striking down the STEP Act’s gang enhancements would also flow direct-
ly from precedent.216 A challenge to gang enhancements would flow squarely 
from the Court’s growing recognition that juvenile defendants are categorically 
less culpable than adults, and that sentences should account for these differ-
ences.217 In Miller, the Court explained that: “Our decision flows straightfor-
wardly from our precedents: specifically, the principle of Roper, Graham, and 
our individualized sentencing cases that youth matters for purposes of meting 
out the law’s most serious punishments.”218 Like the challenge in Miller, a 
challenge to the STEP Act would merely be asking the court to build upon past 
cases requiring for the factor of youth to be accounted for at the sentencing 
stage.219 
Even if a challenge to the STEP Act did not fit so squarely into Miller’s 
procedural exception, the Court has been arguably minimizing the importance 
of national consensus in its categorical Eighth Amendment analysis.220 In 
2010, in Graham v. Florida, for example, the Supreme Court held that there 
                                                                                                                           
 213 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 (“Our decision . . . . mandates only that a sentencer follow a 
certain process—considering an offender's youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a 
particular penalty.”). Similarly, in 1982 in Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court vacated a death 
sentence imposed on a defendant who was sixteen when he killed a police officer. See 455 U.S. at 
105. In that case, the Court held that a sentencing judge cannot refuse to consider relevant mitigating 
factors when deciding whether to issue the death penalty. Id. at 114–15. The Court noted that the 
challenge did not require the Court to prohibit the use of the death penalty; it simply required the 
Court to issue instructions as to the types of procedures that must be followed before a trial court 
could issue a death sentence. See id. at 111–12. 
 214 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 (differentiating between procedural challenges and substantive 
challenges); supra notes 172–186 and accompanying text (discussing the mandatory nature of the 
gang enhancements). 
 215 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471. 
 216 See id. (explaining that a challenge to mandatory LWOP as applied to juveniles was consistent 
with precedent illustrating that juveniles are less culpable than adults); infra notes 217–219 and ac-
companying text. 
 217 See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (holding that mandatory LWOP sentences violate the 
Eighth Amendment when applied to juveniles); Graham, 560 U.S. at 74–75 (holding that juveniles 
cannot be sentenced to LWOP for non-homicidal crimes); Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (banning the death 
penalty for juveniles). 
 218 132 S. Ct. at 2471. 
 219 See id. at 2469, 2471; Graham, 560 U.S. at 74–75; Roper, 543 U.S. at 575. 
 220 See Berman, supra note 6, at 23–24 (arguing that the Court has been relying more heavily on 
penological theories); Farrell, supra note 83, at 901 (arguing that “[t]here are . . . several reasons that 
suggest the Court will—and should—disavow Objective Indicia Analysis across the Eighth Amend-
ment board”). 
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was no national consensus in favor of the challenged sentence, even though 
thirty-seven out of fifty states permitted it.221 In reaching this decision, the 
Graham Court focused on two obscure aspects of national consensus: the de-
liberate intentions of the legislatures and the frequency with which the sen-
tences were actually imposed.222 After Graham, it is possible that even a popu-
larly adopted sentencing scheme could fail to satisfy the national consensus 
prong so long as some indicia of national consensus indicate a lack of sup-
port.223 Thus, the Court has arguably shifted the weight of its Eighth Amend-
ment analysis away from national consensus and toward the Court’s subjective 
interpretation of the theoretical justifications for the punishment at issue.224 
B. The Court’s Subjective Judgment: Underlying Theories of Punishment 
Because national consensus would be unlikely to bear on the Court’s 
analysis, the Court would focus on a subjective analysis of the punishment.225 
The Court should conclude under this prong of the analysis that the STEP 
Act’s gang enhancements are unconstitutional because they do not serve any 
penological objectives.226 Under the subjective prong, the Court would evalu-
ate whether the gang enhancements are justified under any theories of punish-
ment.227 The Court does this by assessing the underlying penological justifica-
tions for the challenged punishment.228 Because the penological justifications 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See 560 U.S. at 107 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Richard M. Ré, Can Congress Overturn Graham 
v. Florida?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 370 (2011) (arguing that the Graham Court relied pri-
marily on its subjective assessment of traditional penological justifications); Steiker & Steiker, supra 
note 2, at 83 (discussing how Graham relied on obscure indicators of national consensus, essentially 
bypassing this objective prong). 
 222 See 560 U.S. at 66–67; Ré, supra note 221, at 368. 
 223 See 560 U.S. at 62–67; Ré, supra note 221, at 368; see also Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme 
Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. 
REV. 785, 799–800 (2009) (explaining that the Court might be willing to rely on a wide variety of 
factors, such as the frequency with which prosecutors seek a particular sentence, when evaluating the 
extent of national consensus regarding a punishment). 
 224 See supra notes 220–223 and accompanying text. 
 225 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (demonstrating that the Court relied heavily on its subjective 
analysis); Ré, supra note 221, at 370 (arguing that the Court in Graham was persuaded by its own 
subjective analysis even though its holding relied, in part, on national consensus considerations). 
 226 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465–66 (explaining that mandatory LWOP for juveniles does not 
adequately serve any penological objectives); Graham, 560 U.S. at 74–75 (explaining that penological 
objectives do not support imposing LWOP sentences on non-homicide juvenile offenders); infra notes 
233–279 and accompanying text (analyzing the penological justifications for mandatory gang en-
hancements as applied to juveniles). 
 227 Graham, 560 U.S. at 67 (explaining that the Constitution requires the court to exercise its own 
independent judgment to determine if it thinks the punishment is justified). 
 228 See id. at 71–75; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
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for applying gang enhancements to juveniles are weak, the Court should not 
uphold the STEP Act.229 
When considered in light of the unique characteristics of juvenile offend-
ers, penological justifications are as unpersuasive for the STEP Act as they 
were for the sentencing scheme reviewed in Miller.230 Miller explained that 
juveniles are different from adults in three key ways: they are (1) less able to 
assess risk; (2) more susceptible to outside influences; (3) and do not have a 
fully developed character.231 In light of these differences, the STEP Act’s gang 
enhancements do not adequately serve deterrent, retributive, rehabilitative, or 
incapacitation penological objectives and, therefore, fail to satisfy the subjec-
tive prong of the Court’s analysis.232 
1. Deterrence 
Gang enhancement statutes are commonly justified as deterrent measures 
taken in response to public fears about the perpetuation of gang violence.233 
Under a deterrent theory of punishment, the STEP Act would make juveniles 
less likely to commit felonies in association with a criminal street gang be-
cause they will be averse to enhanced sentences.234 Nevertheless, deterrence 
fails to justify subjecting juveniles to gang enhancements because the assump-
tions underlying deterrence theory do not apply in the context of juvenile gang 
activity.235 
The deterrence theory of punishment is based on the idea that increased 
punishments create a disincentive for actors to break the law.236 The deterrence 
                                                                                                                           
 229 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465–66. 
 230 Compare id. (explaining that mandatory LWOP for juveniles does not adequately serve any 
penological objectives), with Van Hofwegen, supra note 9, at 689–91 (arguing that penological justi-
fications fail to explain the STEP Act’s gang enhancements and that the STEP Act was not designed 
to punish effectively). 
 231 See 132 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 232 See Van Hofwegen, supra note 9, at 689–91. 
 233 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West 2012) (demonstrating the legislative intent behind the 
STEP Act); Van Hofwegen, supra note 9, at 691. The legislative findings in the STEP Act articulate a 
goal of “eradicating” criminal street gangs. PENAL § 186.21. 
 234 See Bentham, supra note 97, at 92 (arguing that individuals calculate their actions based on 
the potential for pleasure or pain). But see Miller, 132 U.S. at 2465 (demonstrating that the Court was 
skeptical of the deterrent value of punishment as applied to juveniles). 
 235 See Miller, 132 U.S. at 2465 (holding that juveniles are unlikely to be deterred by mandatory 
sentencing schemes); Van Hofwegen, supra note 9, at 686–89 (arguing that instead of leading to a 
decrease in crime—as would be expected if deterrence worked—the STEP Act has led to an increase 
in crime). 
 236 See Bentham, supra note 97, at 92; Robinson & Darley, supra note 97, at 93. 
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model is based on three assumptions.237 First, the actor must know the pun-
ishment for breaking the law.238 Next, the actor must perceive the cost of 
breaking the law as greater than the benefit of breaking the law.239 Finally, the 
actor must be able to apply this calculation at the time of deciding whether or 
not to commit the offense.240 
The gang enhancements fail to deter juvenile gang crime in part because 
it is unlikely that juveniles accurately account for the role of sentence en-
hancements and alter their behavior accordingly.241 Even if juveniles are aware 
of the sentence enhancements, the perceived benefits of being in a gang may 
cause juveniles to overlook the enhancements’ negative ramifications.242 Put 
simply, juvenile offenders do not think critically about the consequences of 
their actions.243 
Lastly, the deterrent effect of the enhancements should be calculated in 
light of the deterrent effect of alternative sentencing schemes.244 Even without 
the enhancements, juvenile offenders would still face felony sentences.245 Just 
as the Supreme Court in 2005 in Roper v. Simmons found it unlikely that the 
death penalty would deter juvenile offenders any more than a life sentence 
would, it is unlikely that the gang enhancements would add any deterrent value 
                                                                                                                           
 237 Robinson & Darley, supra note 97, at 93; see infra notes 237–240 and accompanying text. 
 238 Robinson & Darley, supra note 97, at 93. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
 241 See Miller, 132 U.S. at 2465 (holding that juveniles are unlikely to be deterred by mandatory 
sentencing schemes); Arnett, supra note 73, at 350–54 (observing that adolescents inaccurately assess 
risk and are particularly susceptible to peer influences); Van Hofwegen, supra note 9, at 689 (arguing 
that enhancements may strengthen gangs, rather than deter involvement, by increasing gang solidari-
ty); see also Caldwell, supra note 81, at 34 (arguing that juveniles are unlikely to be deterred by Cali-
fornia’s three strikes law). 
 242 See Van Hofwegen, supra note 9, at 690 (arguing that lengthy sentences may increase gang 
participation by encouraging juveniles to turn to prison gangs in order to survive in jail). 
 243 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; Arnett, supra note 73, at 350–54 (explaining why adolescents 
are more likely to engage in “reckless” behavior); see also Schwartz, supra note 150, at 49 (explaining 
that the Supreme Court has recognized that neuroscience explains some of the differences between 
juveniles and adults). The Supreme Court in Miller explained that the deterrence model failed to justi-
fy mandatory sentences of LWOP for juveniles because juvenile defendants are unlikely to consider 
their potential punishment. 132 S. Ct. at 2465. Likewise in Roper, the Court explained that although it 
was generally willing to defer to the legislature to decide if a statute effectively deters, it was especial-
ly concerned that juveniles were not susceptible to deterrence. 543, U.S. at 571. 
 244 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 572 (comparing the deterrent effect of the challenged sentence to the 
next most severe sentence). 
 245 See Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 
(West 2012) (amended 2013) (demonstrating that the enhancements are added to the underlying pen-
alty); Baker, supra note 178, at 105 (explaining that the enhancements are given in addition to the 
punishment for the underlying felony). 
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that is not captured by the already lengthy penalties associated with the under-
lying felonies.246 
2. Retribution 
Retribution also fails to justify the enhancements.247 The theory of retri-
bution is based on the idea that criminals should be punished because they are 
blameworthy.248 Therefore, the punishment should be proportional to the 
“wickedness” of the offense.249 The retributive model fails to justify gang en-
hancements in the context of juveniles because, not only is it unclear that a 
felony committed as part of a gang is any more “wicked” or deserving of pun-
ishment than one committed outside of the gang context, it is also widely rec-
ognized that juveniles are less culpable for their actions.250 
The retributive model assumes that the punishment should fit the 
crime.251 By tripling the punishment for some felonies, under a theory of retri-
bution, the STEP Act assumes that juvenile gang members convicted of felo-
nies are far more culpable than unaffiliated offenders.252 This conflicts with the 
Court’s reasoning in Miller, which recognized that juveniles are less blame-
worthy than adults.253 Furthermore, the STEP Act targets offenders that com-
mit crimes in association with a gang, a context in which the characteristics 
that make them less culpable are magnified.254 For this reason, juvenile gang 
members could even arguably be viewed as less culpable than unassociated 
juvenile offenders.255 Because of this diminished culpability, retributive theory 
                                                                                                                           
 246 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 572. 
 247 See Van Hofwegen, supra note 9, at 689 (arguing that the increased penalty does not align 
with the culpability of juvenile gang members). 
 248 Hart, supra note 96, at 236. 
 249 Id. 
 250 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (highlighting that juveniles’ diminished culpability should be ac-
counted for under a theory of retribution); see also Hart, supra note 96, at 236 (explaining that pun-
ishment should be proportioned to the “wickedness” of the crime). 
 251 See Hart, supra note 96, at 236. 
 252 See Baker, supra note 178, at 105 (noting that the enhancements can more than double the 
maximum punishment for the underlying offense and arguing that the length of the enhancements is 
out of line with the original legislative intent of the statute); Hart, supra note 96, at 236. 
 253 See 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65; see also Arnett, supra note 73, at 350–54 (observing that adoles-
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 254 See Van Hofwegen, supra note 9, at 689–90 (arguing that gang members could be considered 
less culpable than other offenders); supra notes 150–171 and accompanying text. 
 255 See Van Hofwegen, supra note 9, at 689–90. Proponents of the STEP Act might argue that 
juvenile defendants who are involved in a gang are more culpable than their uninvolved peers because 
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suggests that these juvenile gang members should not be subject to enhanced 
sentences by virtue of their gang membership.256 
3. Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation also fails to justify the application of the STEP Act’s gang 
enhancements to juvenile offenders.257 Rehabilitation uses punishment as a 
way to change the criminal’s character.258 It serves a utilitarian purpose be-
cause it reforms criminals and protects the public against further infractions.259 
This theory also posits that punishment can be used to prepare criminals to 
lead more successful lives once they are released from prison.260 In Miller, the 
Court rejected rehabilitation as a justification for mandatory LWOP sentences 
because such a long sentence ignores juveniles’ unique capacity for change.261 
The STEP Act’s gang enhancements are not as severe as the LWOP sen-
tences challenged in Miller, but the harshest enhancement imposes an indeter-
minate life sentence with a minimum term of fifteen years before the offender 
is eligible for parole.262 Like LWOP sentences, these gang enhancements fore-
close the possibility that juvenile offenders could become functional members 
of society until after they have reached middle age.263 
The irreversible harm that many juveniles suffer in prison may also effec-
tively deny them the opportunity to lead normal lives even once they are re-
leased.264 For instance, they are at a high risk of being sexually or physically 
                                                                                                                           
they put themselves in a situation in which they are more likely to commit crimes. See Cheryl L. 
Maxson et al., Differences Between Gang and Nongang Homicides, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 209, 212, 215 
(1985) (explaining that gang homicides are more visible and more violent than nongang homicides; 
gang members are twice as likely to have no prior contact with the homicide victim; and gang mem-
bers charged with homicide are, on average, five years younger than unaffiliated homicide suspects). 
This argument, however, fails to account for the social and economic factors that drive gang involve-
ment. See Alleyne & Wood, supra note 153, at 424. 
 256 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; Hart, supra note 96, at 236; Van Hofwegen, supra note 9, at 
689–90. 
 257 See infra notes 258–268 and accompanying text. 
 258 See Moore, supra note 100, at 98. 
 259 See id. 
 260 See id. 
 261 132 S. Ct. at 2465. 
 262 Compare Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act, CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 186.22(b)(4) (West 2012) (amended 2013) (demonstrating the length of the most severe gang en-
hancement), with Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (discussing the severity of an LWOP sentence). 
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S. Ct. at 2465 (explaining how long sentences—specifically LWOP—might foreclose rehabilitation). 
 264 See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAR-OLD 
CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON 14 (2008), available at http://www.eji.org/files/Cruel%20and%
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assaulted by older prisoners and prison staff.265 Long prison sentences also 
deny juvenile offenders the opportunity to develop the social skills needed to 
mature.266 Instead, many will begin using drugs or turn to prison gangs as a 
means of surviving, making it less likely that they will ultimately become 
functioning members of society.267 The notion that gang enhancements better 
society by rehabilitating juvenile offenders is dubious in light of the realities of 
prison life for juvenile offenders.268 
4. Incapacitation 
Finally, incapacitation does not support applying the STEP Act’s gang en-
hancements to juveniles.269 Incapacitation justifies punishment as a way of 
restraining criminals who would otherwise be likely to commit crimes.270 In-
capacitation assumes that juvenile offenders would otherwise be a danger to 
                                                                                                                           
20Unusual%202008_0.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9A5J-KHQD (demonstrating that juveniles are 
treated poorly in adult prisons); infra notes 265–268 and accompanying text. 
 265 See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 264, at 14 (discussing the prevalence of sexual and 
physical assault of juveniles in adult prisons); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AGAINST ALL ODDS: PRISON 
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report these assaults. Id. at 19. 
 266 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 265, at 10. 
 267 See id. at 12 (suggesting that the harshness of long sentences makes juvenile offenders feel 
less motivated to develop positive skills); Matthew J. Cannata, Note, Achieving Peace in the Streets: 
How Legislative Efforts Fail in Combating Gang Violence in Comparison to Successful Local Com-
munity-Based Initiatives, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 243, 252 (2009) (arguing 
that juveniles released from jail often come out having honed their criminal skills after turning to 
prison gangs to survive). 
 268 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 265, at 26 (explaining that most prison programs do 
not actively foster the skills necessary to prevent recidivism); supra notes 264–267 and accompanying 
text. 
 269 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2465 (explaining that long sentences ignore the fact that juveniles have 
a great capacity to change); infra notes 270–276 and accompanying text. 
 270 See John J. Diiulio, Jr., Prisons Are a Bargain, By Any Measure, in CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
PROCESSES, supra note 96, at 102, 102 (arguing that keeping convicts in prison is a cost-effective way 
of preventing them from committing other crimes). 
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society during the length of their sentence.271 Such a judgment is inconsistent 
with the understanding that juveniles have a strong capacity for change.272 
Incapacitation also does not justify the STEP Act’s gang enhancements be-
cause for many offenders, gang membership is isolated to their teenage years.273 
As many as two-thirds of juvenile gang members terminate their gang member-
ship within one year of joining.274 In fact, there is evidence that extended sen-
tences serve to prolong gang membership because juveniles turn to gangs while 
in prison in order to survive.275 Thus, whereas children have an enormous capac-
ity to change, gang enhancements actually impair that ability by imposing 
lengthy prison sentences.276 
In sum, the STEP Act’s gang enhancements are contrary to Miller’s 
recognition that juveniles have diminished culpability.277 The STEP Act and 
others like it impose mandatory minimum sentence enhancements on juveniles 
who commit crimes in a gang context, a setting in which factors that diminish 
juvenile culpability are magnified.278 Therefore, the Supreme Court should 
hold that the STEP Act’s gang enhancements, when applied to juveniles, vio-
late the Eighth Amendment’s requirement that punishment be grounded in pe-
nological theory.279 
CONCLUSION 
In 2012, in Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court recognized that juve-
niles are categorically less culpable than adult offenders. In light of these dif-
                                                                                                                           
 271 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2465; Graham, 560 U.S. at 72–73; Diiulio, supra note 270, at 102. 
 272 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (explaining that long sentences ignore the fact that juveniles 
have a great capacity to change). See generally Jeffrey D. Colman, From Death Row to Rehabilitation 
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ferences, the Court chose to adopt a categorical approach when reviewing 
Eighth Amendment challenges to life-without-parole (LWOP) sentences for 
juvenile offenders. This approach marked a departure from the Court’s former 
reluctance to critically review term-of-years sentences. The Court chose to ex-
pand this approach to review term-of-years sentences applied to juveniles be-
cause it recognized that developmental differences make juveniles categorical-
ly less culpable than adults. The Court’s new approach calls into question the 
constitutionality of California’s STEP Act—and others like it—that mandate 
enhanced sentences for juveniles who commit felonies commissioned in asso-
ciation with a criminal street gang. The Miller Court’s categorical analysis im-
plicates the STEP Act because the gang setting magnifies the developmental 
differences that the Court has held make juveniles less culpable than adults. 
Under the Miller analysis, the Court would likely conclude that subjecting ju-
veniles to mandatory gang enhancements serves no penological objectives. 
Therefore, the Court should hold that the STEP Act’s gang enhancements are 
unconstitutional when applied to children. It is time for the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment analysis to mature.  
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